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Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Law: The
Evolution of Informed Consent, Advance Directives
and Surrogate Decision Making
Joseph T. Monahan, M.S. W., A. C.S. W., J.D.*
Elizabeth A. Lawhorn, J.D.**
The past twenty-five years have seen great
advances in life-sustaining medical technology
capable of extending life far past its natural end.
With these advances, legislatures and courts have
struggled with the complex legal and ethical issues
associated with end-of-life decision making and
refusal of life-sustaining treatment. The courts and
state legislatures have generally agreed that
competent persons have a right to direct decisions
concerning their medical care. However, they have
struggled in balancing this right against a state's
interest in the preservation and sanctity of human
life. The issue only becomes more difficult and
complex when decisions regarding life-sustaining
treatment are sought to be made on behalf of persons
who lack capacity to direct their own medical care
and treatment. Both state legislatures and courts at
every level, including the United States Supreme
Court, have struggled with determining whether such
decisions should be made and, if so, where the
boundaries of such authority lie.
The last twenty-five years have been witness to a number of "right to
die" cases that have garnered national attention and interest, sparking the
debate over advance directives and surrogate decision making with regard
to life-sustaining treatment. There have also been great advances in
legislation at both the national and local level on surrogate decision making
and advance directives, aimed at protecting an individual's right to make
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decisions about his or her future medical care in anticipation of a time when
the individual may be found incompetent. This article provides a brief
history of the advances in the law over the last several decades with regard
to this area-an area that involves highly personal, ethical, and moral
questions.
I. AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Many state courts have rendered decisions regarding whether lifesustaining treatment may be withdrawn for individuals rendered
incompetent. Perhaps the most well-known state case is that of In re Karen
Quinlan, decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1976.1 Karen
Quinlan, then twenty-one years old, remained in a persistent vegetative state
after she ceased breathing for a lengthy period of time. Her father sought to
become the court-appointed guardian of her person with the specific
authority to discontinue life-sustaining measures. The trial court, however,
refused to appoint him. The New Jersey Supreme Court ordered the trial
court to appoint Karen's father as guardian of her person and determined
that life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn upon the opinion of the
attending physicians that Karen lacked the possibility of recovery, and with
the concurrence of the guardian and family. In so ruling, the court found
that "no external compelling interest of the State could compel Karen
[Quinlan] to endure the unendurable, only to vegetate a few measurable
months with no realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of
cognitive or sapient life.",2 Basing its decision on the right to privacy, the
court found that Karen's right could be exerted on her behalf by her
guardian under the "peculiar circumstances" of the case. For years, the
Quinlan case served as guidance for many courts forced to address the same
difficult questions in their state.
The issue came to the national forefront, however, in 1990 with the
landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Cruzan v. Director of Missouri
Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In January of 1983, Nancy
Cruzan was involved in a car accident which resulted in a comatose state
and, eventually, a progressive vegetative state. After it became clear that
Nancy had virtually no chance of regaining her mental abilities, her parents
petitioned the court for an order authorizing termination of artificial
nutrition and hydration, which would have resulted in her death. Missouri
law required clear and convincing evidence of the patient's desire to forego
life-sustaining treatment before a guardian could authorize withdrawal of
such treatment. The evidence at trial of Nancy's wishes included a prior

1. In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
2. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654.
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statement she had made to her roommate approximately one year prior to
her accident wherein she stated that she would not want to live should she
face life as a "vegetable," and other similar observations. The Missouri trial
court found this evidence sufficient; however, on direct appeal by both the
State and the Guardian ad litem, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
trial court, holding that Nancy's statements were unreliable in determining
her intent and did not constitute "informed refusal" of treatment.3
Upon further appeal, in a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court.4 The multiple
concurring and dissenting opinions in the case highlight the struggle of the
justices in determining the boundaries of judicial intervention with respect
to issues such as the choice between life and death. Ultimately, as set forth
in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, the Court found that the Due Process
Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing lifesustaining medical treatment. The Court held that Missouri was warranted
in its use of heightened evidentiary requirements in order to safeguard the
personal element of the choice between life and death and to correctly
apportion the risk of an erroneous decision on the party seeking to end lifesustaining treatment.5
The Court declined to adopt the petitioners'
alternative argument that Missouri must accept the "substituted judgment"
of close family members, holding instead that the Due Process Clause does
not require the State "to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but
6
the patient herself.",
Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion that few individuals
provide explicit instructions regarding their intent to refuse medical
treatment should they be rendered incompetent. She recognized, however,
that delegating the authority to make medical decisions was becoming more
common and several states had enacted durable power of attorney statutes
authorizing an individual to appoint a surrogate to make medical treatment
decisions. She noted that the Cruzan opinion did not address whether a
State must give effect to the decisions of a surrogate decision maker, stating
that such a duty may well be constitutionally required.
The Cruzan decision drew national attention and highlighted the use of
advance directives as a means for competent individuals to clearly state
their wishes with regard to life-sustaining treatment in advance of an
unforeseen crisis. In the wake of the Cruzan decision, the United States
3. Cruzan v. Dir. of Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268 (1990).
4. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion of the Court. He was joined by Justices
White, Kennedy, O'Connor and Scalia. Justices O'Connor and Scalia both authored
concurring opinions. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented. Justices
Brennan and Stevens both authored dissenting opinions.
5. Cruzan,497 U.S. at281.
6. Id. at 286.
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Congress passed the Patient Self Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)
(PSDA).7 Signed into law by President Bush as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, the PSDA serves as a strong statement
in favor of educating the public about advance directives in order to prevent
cases such as Nancy Cruzan's from recurring.
Among other things, the PSDA requires many hospitals, nursing
facilities, and certain other health care providers to provide written
information to adult individuals receiving medical care concerning their
rights under State law to make decisions concerning their medical care,
including the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment and the
right to formulate advance directives. The Act defines "advance directive"
as a written instruction, such as a living will or durable power of attorney
for health care, recognized under State law, whether statutory or as
recognized by the courts of the State, and relating to the provision of
medical care when the individual is incapacitated.
The PSDA requires the health care provider to document in the
individual's medical record whether or not the individual has executed an
advance directive. In an effort to encourage the use of advance directives,
the PSDA requires health care providers to provide education for staff and
the community on issues concerning advance directives. Furthermore, it
called for the Secretary to implement a national campaign within six
months of the Act's enactment to inform the public of advance directives
and of the patient's right to participate in and direct health care decisions.
While the PSDA encouraged the execution of advance directives by a
competent individual prior to being rendered incompetent, it did nothing to
address the situation of life-sustaining treatment for an incompetent
individual who had not previously executed a valid advance directive.
Decisions regarding the latter situation have been left to individual states to
tackle.
II. AT THE ILLINOIS LEVEL
There have been great strides in Illinois law regarding advance directives
and surrogate decision making in the last twenty-five years. As with most
states, Illinois has had its share of controversial cases, such as In re Estate
of Longeway, wherein the Illinois Supreme Court held that a courtappointed guardian was authorized to exercise a ward's right to refuse lifesustaining treatment based on a "substituted judgment" standard.8 Illinois
has also passed broad legislation providing for advance directives and
7. Bills for passage of the Patient Self Determination Act were already being considered
at the time of the Cruzan decision. However, the Cruzan decision served as the impetus for
passage of the PSDA in Congress.
8. In re Estate of Longeway, 133 1l.2d 33 (1989).
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss1/23
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substitute decision making. For example, the Illinois Living Will Act,
effective January 1, 1984, recognizes the "fundamental right to control the
decisions relating to the rendering of [ ] medical care, including the decision
to have death delaying procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a
terminal condition." 9Accordingly, the Act allows individuals to execute a
document directing that if they suffer from a "terminal condition," i.e. an
incurable and irreversible condition which is such that death is imminent
and the application of death delaying procedures serves only to prolong the
dying process, then death delaying procedures shall not be utilized to
prolong their life.10 Similarly, the Illinois Power of Attorney Act, effective
September 22, 1987, recognizes an individual's right to control all aspects
of his or her medical treatment, including the right to direct that it be
withdrawn, "even if death ensues."'11 The Act therefore allows an
individual to delegate to an "agent" all health care powers that the
individual may have, including the power to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment. 12
These Acts reflect a consensus among states that a competent individual
has the right to direct future decisions regarding his or her health care,
including the decision to forego life-sustaining treatment. However, in
1991, Illinois went one step further by creating legislation to specify the
circumstances under which life-sustaining treatment could be withdrawn on
behalf of an incompetent individual in absence of an advance directive.
The Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act reflects the view of the legislature
that decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment are private and may be
made "without judicial involvement of any kind."13
Among its strongly-worded legislative findings, the Act states that "lack
of decisional capacity, alone, should not prevent decisions to forgo lifesustaining treatment from being made on behalf of persons who lack
decisional capacity and have no known applicable living will or power of
attorney for health care." 14 The legislature goes on to state that "uncertainty
and lack of clarity in the law concerning the making of private decisions
concerning medical treatment and to forgo life-sustaining treatment,
without judicial involvement, causes unnecessary emotional distress to the
individuals involved and unduly
impedes upon the individual right to forgo
15
life-sustaining treatment."
9. Ill. Living Will Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN. 35/1 (2009).
10. Id. at 35/2, 35/3 (2009).
11. Ill. Power of Attorney Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN 45/4-1 (2009).
12. Powers of Attorney for Health Care, 755 ILL. COV. STAT.ANN 45/4-3 (2009).
13. Health Care Surrogate Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN 40/5(b) (2009) (emphasis
added).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Accordingly, under the Act, decisions whether to forgo life-sustaining
treatment on behalf of a minor or an adult patient without "decisional
capacity"' 16 are lawful, without resort to the courts or legal process, if the
patient has a terminal condition, permanent unconsciousness, or incurable
or irreversible condition, as defined under the Act. 7 Decisions must be
made by the surrogate decision maker in consultation with the attending
physician. The surrogate decision maker must conform as closely as
possible to what the patient would have done or intended under the
circumstances, taking into account evidence including the patient's
personal, philosophical, religious, moral and ethical values relative to the
purpose of life, sickness, medical procedures, suffering, and death. If the
patient's wishes are unknown, the surrogate decision maker is to make the
decision in the patient's best interests, taking into account the views of
family and friends that the surrogate decision maker believes the patient
would have considered.18
The Act applies only when a patient does not have a valid advance
directive, such as an unrevoked living will or an authorized agent under a
power of attorney for healthcare. The Act sets forth a hierarchy of
surrogate decision makers as follows: (1) the patient's guardian of the
person; (2) the patient's spouse; (3) any adult son or daughter of the patient;
(4) either parent of the patient; (5) any adult brother or sister of the patient;
(6) any adult grandchild of the patient; (7) a close friend of the patient; (8)
the patient's guardian of the estate.1 9
When the last several decades are reviewed, it is fascinating to consider
the evolution of the law with respect to decisions regarding life-sustaining
treatment-from the creation of state statutes allowing for advance
directives to legislation not only allowing for a surrogate decision maker to
make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment in absence of advance
directives, but also allowing such decisions to be made in certain cases
based on the surrogate's determination as to the "best interests" of the

16. Decisional capacity is defined as the ability to understand and appreciate the nature
and consequences of a decision regarding medical treatment or forgoing life-sustaining
treatment and the ability to reach and communicate an informed decision in the matter as
determined by the attending physician.
17. Notably, after its passage, the HCSA was amended to allow a surrogate to make
certain other medical decisions in addition to decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment.
As to the former, the patient must lack decisional capacity, but no qualifying condition is
required.
18. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN 40/20 (2009).
19.

See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN 40/25(2009).When two or more surrogates in equal

priority disagree about a decision, the majority in that category controls, unless the minority
initiates guardianship proceedings. Although the HCSA aims to avoid court intervention, in
the event there is no controlling majority, the assistance of the court may be, and often is,
sought.
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person rendered incompetent. A review of the law also provides an
interesting look at the struggle of the legislature and the courts in
determining the boundaries of their authority to intervene in areas of the law
that have such personal, ethical and moral roots. As individual cases such
as the Terry Schiavo matter continue to garner national attention, it is likely
that these debates will continue in the decades to come despite increasing
legislation to address such situations.
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